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Abstract  
Amendments to the South African Schools Act –SASA, (Act 84 of 1996), have changed public school 
governance. These changes have had a domino effect on how public schools function today. School 
Governing Bodies (SGB) as the major role-players in public school governance have experienced its 
effect. In this article we explore the perceptions of school role-players involved in school governance 
in Gauteng (a province in South Africa).   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
School governance in South Africa has moved from a highly centralised structure to what is supposed 
to be one of shared responsibility. The South African Schools Act [1] provides for parents to be an 
integral part of school governance. This article will make a fresh contribution to the existing body of 
knowledge by showing how school governance is furtively being re-centralised and also offering 
credible reasons for the State reneging on its original promises and intentions in 1996. 
There is an inextricable relationship between democracy, education and school governance. After 
twenty years of constitutional democracy, the disturbing percentage of dysfunctional schools raises 
questions about distributed or shared school governance. In this article we report on the findings of the 
qualitative research on the perceptions of school governing body (SGB) members on governance of 
schools in Gauteng (a province in South Africa) in 2013-2014. We use interviews with School 
Governing Bodies (SGB) in six schools in different school districts in Gauteng to gather data. SGBs 
are the vehicles of Education policies, since they, must convey the States’ decisions on school 
governance to their communities. Who better than they can evaluate school governance? One of the 
researchers experienced several undemocratic features in school governance in many schools which 
he found was the result of systemic flaws. 
1.1  Problem statement, and concept clarification 
School governance in public schools in South Africa has been transformed because of amendments to 
existing legislation which had the outcome of changing the decision making powers of the School 
Governing Body (SGB), accorded to it by the South African Schools Act [1]. The establishment of 
school governing bodies was a meaningful benchmark in the state’s move towards distributing school 
governance to local communities. Such decentralisation meant an increase in democratic participation 
in the governance of schools. School governance as practiced today does not reflect shared 
governance; the picture that surfaces at school level does not show the SGB as partners, having any 
constructive decision- making power. The obverse picture emerges, namely one, which cautions 
against too much involvement by the SGB. The SGBs power has been modified through amendments 
to the SASA particularly as concerns the following:  
• the admission of learners to public schools 
• the control of school finances in a latent form of financial management 
1.1.1 Objectives  
Our objectives in this article are to: 
• report on the perceptions of SGBs in a sample of Gauteng public schools related to the rights, 
obligations and functions of members regarding the governance of a public school; and 
• investigate the ostensible inclination of the state to question and doubt the authority and capabilities 
of school governing bodies, to the extent of taking steps to limit the involvement and powers of role-
players concerning the appointment of educators, admission of learners and effective financial 
management.. 
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
Conflict theory emphasises the role of coercion and power in producing social order. This perspective 
is derived from the works of Karl Marx [2] who saw society as fragmented into groups that compete for 
social and economic resources. Social order is maintained by domination, with power vested in the 
hands of those with the greatest political, economic, and social resources. When consensus exists, it 
is attributable to people being united around common interests, often in opposition to other groups. 
Ritzer, (id) theorised that the work of producing consensus was done in the "superstructure" of society-
-which is composed of state controlled bodies (one of these in South Africa are public schools), 
political structures, and culture--and what it produced consensus for, was the "base," authoritarianism. 
According to conflict theory, inequality exists because those in control of a disproportionate share of 
society’s resources actively defend their advantages [3]. The school/SGB are not bound to the state 
by their shared values, but by intimidation (through Education officials) who use contractual 
compliance to elicit subservience and this ensures the state’s authority over school governance. This 
authoritarian perspective emphasises social domination, through employing the ideology, and 
hegemonic rhetoric of the African National Congress (ANC) [4]. This results in an imbalance of power, 
wherein the minority in the upper classes control political power, and thus they make the rules of 
society in a way that privileges their continued accumulation of wealth, at the economic and political 
expense of the majority of society, who provide most of the labour required for society to function [3]. 
The power of the state (ANC) is present in the Education departments’ bureaucrats, who act as 
purveyors of the state’s policies to maintain the established hierarchical order [4]. Economic power is 
also guaranteed for the new black African elite. This bourgeois class uses [5] its economic power to 
exert political influence [6]. The extremely wealthy black African elite, thus turn their economic power 
into political power, which in turn protects their economic interests, and ensures their hold on both 
forms of power [7].  
The principle of fairness when confronted by this authoritarianism is constantly challenged by the 
realities of inequalities, and the solution lies in the ANC trying to resolve the situation through politics 
and welfare benefits, like the Public School Nutrition Programme (PSNP) [6]. 
3 SGBS VERSUS BUREAUCRACY IN PUBLIC SCHOOL GOVERNANCE 
3.1  Background 
The decentralisation of school governance in South Africa in 1996, and a series of bureaucratic 
actions and intrusive interference by education administrators have led to legal battles that indicate a 
wilful disregard for, or a lack of knowledge of the democratic values and principles that are necessary 
to promote effectiveness and efficiency in education. The promotion of the ANC government’s 
ideology of transformation and equity in the drive for State hegemony manifested in actions like the: 
  Amendments to legislation when SGBs had won legal battles over the attempts by the 
provincial education authorities to re-centralise control and power in key issues in education. 
In this context, the controversial actions and decisions of the State raises the concern that democracy 
in education is being compromised, and as a result, that the efficiency and optimal effectiveness of 
distributed or shared school governance is being undermined.  
3.1.1 Democracy in Education 
The word democracy has become context bound, however the common core principles of liberal 
democracy include the notions of shared governance by the people, either directly through 
participation and deliberation, or indirectly through accountable and responsive representatives fairly 
by majority vote[7]. Furthermore, democracy entails state protection of fundamental political and civil 
rights in terms of the rule of law and that the power of democratic institutions and pluralist interests are 
controlled by checks and balances and the distribution of power that would have been held by the 
centre (the State) [8] . The South African Constitution embraces an integrated model that postulates 
an indirect representative democracy and protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. It also 
encompasses, direct deliberative and participatory mechanisms, measures in institutions that the 
State shares power with [9].  
The envisaged form of school governance post-1994, as contained in the South African Schools Act 
(1996), proposes shared responsibility in the Education of the child. South Africans are justified in 
assuming that it is their right to expect that the redesigned school system for a democratic South 
Africa would be tangibly new, more equitable, and empowering to all who have a direct stake in the 
success of schooling [10]. The state foresaw that through fomenting a partnership with communities, 
schools would become desegregated since parents from different race groups would participate in its 
governance.   
However there is little evidence to show that desegregation as envisaged by SASA through integrated 
schooling has succeeded; differences still arise because of race and culture in daily classroom life 
[11]. Chisholm [12] justifies her assertion by referring to the much publicised media reports that has 
shown that South Africans are strongly xenophobic. The academic debate on anti-racism and critical 
multiculturalism have not filtered down to the level of the school and even more crucially, to classroom 
practice in South Africa. This has resulted in vast differences in education standards between 
township schools and ex-model C schools. Bureaucratic meddling and maladministration has 
exacerbated the divide, [13]. 
 If the South African education system achieves a measure of success, it will be able to provide its 
society with future workers, who possess skills, knowledge, values, and attitudes that will enable them 
to be employed [14]. It is the researcher’s assertion, from personal experience as a Principal and 
Deputy Director of the Department of Education (DoE), that Governance of public schools has been 
scarred by some of the legislation and policies for schooling, which is constantly being subjected to a 
process of transformation and revision. What was the likely effect of curriculum changes on the 
finances of poor schools? Schools were resourced with learner and teacher support material (LTSM) 
by the state. Most of the state subsidy for the school was intended for this purpose (SASA, 1996: 
Section 20 “schools-Financing”). Teachers are still grappling with the tenets of Outcomes Based 
Education; even, the costly Learner Teacher Support Material (LTSM) did not improve learner 
performance. Instead it exacerbated the situation, both financially and motivationally, since these 
schools were now branded as being “under-performing” schools [15].Sayed and Motala [16] explains 
that “great strides have been made towards racial equity in terms of state per capita expenditure per 
learner, but more contentious is the extent to which redress or differential spending has been 
achieved”. 
The inherent conflict arising between the macro levels (DoE) and the micro level (Schools) concerning 
school governance, particularly in the handling of Educational policies has often been reported in 
South African newspapers. This leads to an inherent tension between the State and schools. [17]. 
Bureaucratic expectations of SGBs is that they comply with what is expected by the State through the 
policies; any deviation is seen as an act of defiance. 
3.1.2 Bureaucratic meddling in school Governance 
Weber [18], explains bureaucracy, as a system of administration with the following characteristics: 
hierarchy; impersonality (the work is conducted according to set rules, without arbitrariness or 
nepotism, and with little flexibility or discretion to digress); continuity (the administrative offices 
constitute full-time salaried occupations, with security of employment and prospects for regular 
advancement); and expertise (officials are selected on merit, are trained for their function, and control 
access to knowledge and information because written record is kept of transactions). 
However, apart from the positive features that improve the efficient and effective functioning of an 
institution, bureaucracy is also associated with negative qualities such as ‘red tape’, non-
accountability, unresponsiveness, delay, inflexibility, ineptitude, centralised superiority and 
undemocratic predispositions [19]. 
This article focuses on the contentious aspects in education, the term bureaucracy (also education 
administration) will be used to denote these negative features. 
The tensions between the demands and values of democracy and the Department of Education’s 
reliance on bureaucracy have not dissipated. The introduction of distributed school governance 
encompasses multiple role-players, but the State has resolved to increase bureaucratic interference in 
school governance whose only outcome can be to surreptitiously re-centralise school governance, as 
is evident in what occurred in the admission fiasco at Rivonia Primary school:   
In 2010, a prospective Grade1 learner was unsuccessful in finding placement at that school for the 
academic year starting in 2011, and was placed on the school’s waiting list. According to the school, it 
had reached its capacity of 120 learners in that grade, as provided for in its admission policy. 
Dissatisfied, the mother of the learner sought recourse with the Department of Education and then 
also lodged an appeal with the Gauteng Member of the Provincial Executive (MEC). Accordingly, the 
matter was taken up by the MEC for Education, Gauteng, and the school principal was instructed to 
admit the learner to the school. The Gauteng Head of the Department of Education (HOD) purported 
to withdraw the principal’s admission function and delegated it to another official. Gauteng Department 
of Education officials proceeded to take control of the situation and thereafter physically placed the 
learner in one of the school’s Grade 1 classrooms, seating her at an empty desk that had been 
installed for a learner with attention and learning difficulties [20]. The HOD-GDE usurped the principal 
of Rivonia primary school’s management functions (acting on behalf of the SGB) to admit learners to 
the school. 
There is a dichotomy between school governance and the professional management of the school 
[21]. It is noteworthy that the term “management” is not used generically, but that it is specifically 
called “professional management”[21].A justifiable conclusion is that the concept “professional 
management” refers to exactly that – “management of the profession and the school [21]). This 
function is precisely that of the school’s senior management team (SMT), with the principal as senior 
manager overseeing this function.  In the relevant sections of SASA the school governing body’s 
tasks, are clearly prescribed. It is the governing body’s duty to “marry” the interests of the different 
parties concerned with educating the child; to ensure that the school provides quality education, while 
also managing a financially sound school. 
According to section 16(3) of SASA, the professional management of a public school must be 
undertaken by the principal, under the authority of the Head of Department (Province). In addition 
professional management of the school must be undertaken subject to the SASA itself and any 
applicable provincial law. In any governance and management environment, the role players should 
be equipped with the specifics of what is expected of them and that each other’s functions are 
respected. If these aspects are denied then eventually it results in conflict – legal and social,[22].The 
legal wrangling is something we are all too familiar with in the context of the relationship between 
governing bodies and the department of education [23]. 
Effective school governance, and management of a school make the difference between a functional 
and a dysfunctional school [24]. The importance of the rapport between a principal and the school 
governing body for the proper functioning of a school is of the essence. This relationship can often be 
compromised by meddling from Education officials who exercise control over the principal because 
they are the employer. The explanation of the two concepts “governance” and “management”, 
evidence the function of a public school principal as twofold: On the one hand, he/she is accountable 
to the Head of Department (Provincial) as his/her employer; on the other, he/she reports to the school 
governing body as an ex-officio member of the school governing body. Therefore, it is possible for the 
principal to receive instructions from the bureaucrats representing the Provincial Department of 
Education (PED) and the particular District and another, contradictory assignment from the SGB. 
In many instances as Prinsloo, [25] explains, a disconcerting trend has emerged of State officials 
exploiting their powers, by improperly impeding the management and governance of schools, 
disregarding their duties, showing no respect for the rule of law, and even ignoring court orders 
against them. The literature highlights a few court cases to confirm this disturbing phenomenon, [26] 
This is visibly corroborated by a senior ANC member and chairperson of a SGB who participated in 
this study: “There’s no structured avenues for voices whereas previously the ANC government was 
keen to have participatory space for communities on all levels of government whether it was schools, 
clinics or hospitals, now the power is with bureaucrats and politicians “(Interview 8 Ln 749-755). 
 A good example is the “Batho Pelo” principles, which act as a guide for Education policy, and which 
means, “Putting people first”[27]. The “Batho Pele” initiative aims to enhance the quality and 
accessibility of government services by improving efficiency and accountability to the recipients of 
public goods and services. It entails the obligation to keep customers regularly informed, establish 
service standards, provide greater access to services, as well as greater openness and transparency, 
and to repair failures and rectify mistakes [28].However what happens at school level seems to 
contradict the principles of “Batho Pele”. The ongoing incapacity of most provincial education 
departments in attempts to administer public schooling effectively, by improving accountability and 
efficiency, has been one of the catalysts for reactionary behaviour, as is seen in on-going teacher 
strikes. The governing bodies of schools become shocked and indecisive when teacher strikes occur, 
which again defeats the assurance provided by “Batho Pele”, namely, “to keep customers regularly 
informed”.  
4 THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
Most of the data in this research was obtained by using a qualitative approach. The qualitative 
analysis was supported by the results obtained from the quantitative interpretation of some of the 
items in the questionnaire. Some of the items in Section A served as independent variables and all the 
closed questions from Section B and C which were formulated in terms of scaled intervals served as 
dependent variables. They were analysed using quantitative techniques via SPSS 21.0. With respect 
to the qualitative collection of data, one-on-one and focus group interviews were conducted with role-
players involved in school governance in six schools from various school districts in the South and 
East of Gauteng. The guiding criterion employed in selecting the schools for this study was not 
whether they represent the totality of schools in South Africa or even in one province, but rather that 
they make up a volume of types of schools in the South and East of Gauteng that comprise the 
collective case study. They were selected as they are scattered along a range of criteria, including 
level of resources according to the DoE’s quintile ranking where schools are divided into national 
quintiles and funded based on the relative wealth of the surrounding community (SA, 1998).  Coupled 
with these quintile criteria the schools are differently positioned in respect of school governance and 
other educational reforms and influence exerted by unions. The two broad types of schools are target 
and better-positioned schools. This study has coined these terms and classify the two chosen types of 
schools as a target school, as one that has a low level of resources (financial as well as physical, 
human, social and capital resources) and the school population hail from households where income 
levels are relatively low. A better positioned school is one with a measurably higher level of resources, 
parental education levels are higher and household income is higher [29]. The schools ranking in 
terms of the National Norms and Standards for School Funding (NNSSF) [29} was the basis to 
determine the relative income of the school and surrounding community. The NNSSF [29] regulations 
are compiled by every province supplying a resource list, which ranks schools in the province in terms 
of the “condition of the school and the relative poverty of the school community” A key consideration in 
the choice of schools was choosing two “no-fee” schools (target schools) because by declaring a 
school “no-fee” school, the State impacts on a key decision making function of the SGB because this 
function is re-centralised. Choosing a better positioned or markedly better resourced school should 
reveal major differences in perceptions about governance. 
4.1  Analysis of the qualitative findings  
Data was gathered from a series of focus group and one-on-one interviews with members of six 
SGBs. The findings emanating from the data were categorised under the following (table 1). 
TABLE 1: ANALYSIS OF QUALITATIVE DATA 
Themes Evidence from Interviews with SGBs 
Control as a source of power The appointment of educators has been 
taken over by the HOD. (Interview 8, 
Ln.171-178) 
ANC-Hegemony  Problems like Nepotism bribery, is why you 
had to curtail the powers of the SGB 
(emphasis added). (Interview 6, Ln.163-
167) 
Financial management I do not see how schools can function 
without school fees. The quintiles are 
allocated wrongly. (Interview 9, Ln. 396) 
In order to reveal the rationale behind the themes arrived at they are now discussed:  
4.1.1 Control as a source of power 
As a result of the judicial victories for SGBs in the cases regarding the appointment and transfer of 
educators, the Department of Education (DoE) had the applicable disconcerting sections of the 
Schools Act and the Employment of Educators Act 60 and 61 amended in parliament on three 
occasions. The Education Laws Amendment Act, No. 48 of 1999 made provision for a time-frame 
within which a governing body must make its recommendations when an educator is appointed; the 
Education Laws Amendment Act, No. 53 of 2000 made provision for the appointment of educators to 
new public schools by the provincial Head of Department (and not a school governing body); and the 
Education Laws Amendment Act, No. 24 of 2005 provides that the SGB must recommend at least 
three candidates and the provincial Member of the Executive Council for Education (MEC) may 
appoint any of the recommended candidates. The MEC may accordingly disregard the school 
governing body’s preferred candidate and may appoint any candidate on the list of three 
recommended candidates, even if it is a less suitably qualified or experienced incumbent. The themes 
and supporting responses in Table 1 showed that participants’ perception towards the amendment to 
the policy determining the appointment and promotion of educators was that SGBs had lost their 
decision- making power over this crucial function. A disheartened school principal described the 
bureaucratic interference as follows: “The others were discarded on racial lines, it was argued by the 
Department that the management of the school was almost totally Indian and therefore the post was 
given to a Coloured incumbent”. (Interview 8, Ln.178-184). Yet another instance where a Black 
incumbent was appointed by the Gauteng Department of Education (GDE), contrary to the 
recommendation of the SGB arose at Roodepoort Primary School. A group of coloured parents started 
protesting at the school on 21 February 2015, demanding a “coloured” principal be appointed. They 
claimed the process of appointing a black African female principal was flawed. The MEC for Education 
in Gauteng chose to remove the black African female principal from the school [30]. 
SGB members from a rural school emphasised how the State (GDE) controls schools and ignores 
school’s policies and therefore the SGB: “The Principal or SGB, cannot declare the school full 
because the department has the right to verify and if they find there is space, they can say you have to 
take the child” (Interview 2, Line 227-231). The state demands complete control of school governance 
and subservience as reflected by these respondents: “You accept what you are told”. (Interview 3, 
Ln.454-463) 
 What would be the motive for the State’s (through the DoE) covert actions? It can only be that school 
governance be re-centralised, so that the State reclaims power over schools. This wielding of power 
over others is the essence of authoritarianism and in this sense a political environment is an 
authoritarian environment [31]. Furthermore Sengé [31] says that such a political climate encourages 
game playing and blaming others. In order to build a non-political climate Sengé [31] states that we 
need to generate a climate where merit is the dominant force. In a climate where merit predominates, 
doing what is right also predominates over ‘who wants what done’. Furthermore Sengé [31] suggests 
that a climate where openness is present is essential. By openness he refers to both participative 
openness where one has the ‘freedom to speak one’s mind’ but also reflective openness where ‘one is 
prepared to challenge your own thinking’.  But what Sengé[31] does not say is that it is easier to speak 
your mind if you have the political power of an overwhelming majority in parliament but more difficult to 
reflect on what you have said because you are in a position of power and do not see the necessity to 
reflect on anything, because you are right. 
4.1.2 ANC-Hegemony - used to control SGB’s 
The term hegemony derives from ancient Greek word ‘hegemonia’ literally meaning the dominant and 
oppressive status of one element in the system over the others. According to Barrett,[32] hegemony 
involves ‘cooperation ensured by force’, combining social and political supervision, force and consent. 
It was within this context that the ANC began to reach for "hegemony". Even if it could not have sole 
power, or even if the ANC had a less than the two-thirds majority it has in parliament and had to 
compete on its own against others; it would nonetheless demand a complete dominance over the 
entire system - and its culture. This determination comes from the testimony that the ANC wants to 
remain in power at all cost [33]. 
The Curriculum Education Specialist’s [(CES) in the study] indicated that “problems like Nepotism and 
bribery, is why you had to curtail the powers of the SGB” (emphasis added)(Interview 6, Ln.163-167) 
in Table 1 above, reverberates a finding of the Ministerial Review committee commissioned by the 
then Minister of Education, K. Asmal ,which found “While, African people are moving into former white, 
Indian and coloured schools in substantial numbers, they are still under-represented in those schools” 
[34]. Since 1999 the ANC led State, grasped desperately at affirmative action and equity, as the only 
"radical" policy to appease its Tri Partite alliance member, the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU) [35]. The South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU) an affiliate of 
COSATU demanded, through protest action like strikes that its members namely black African 
teachers be promoted above others. This gave rise to the State ignoring the SGBs’ recommendations 
and appointing a candidate who in most cases is a member of SADTU. This is substantiated by a 
focus group who were of the opinion that   “If you have your observers present then they act as police. 
We are not concerned with the individual who’s going to gain from this or being bought. (Here the 
focus group is referring to the newspaper article where it is reported that officials and teachers pay 
SADTU to get promotion posts)(Interview 10, Ln.326-241)  This action is justified by the DoE, through 
using the ANC’s ideological concepts, transformation and affirmative action. A focus group from a 
school in Johannesburg South verifies this by adding, “Presently you have cases where the candidate 
is not accepted for, either representatively or capacity” (Hence if the SGB’s recommended incumbent 
is not who GDE prefers, then the Department uses “representivity and capacity” to justify placing their 
desired candidate in the promotion post and rejects the SGB’s preferred candidate. (Interview 4, 
Ln.163-164). It is noteworthy that transformation and affirmative action was the promise on which the 
Tri-partite alliance won the 1994 election (www.politicsweb.co.za/). The State next, had to fund public 
schools so that particularly the black African worker realistically experienced a material change [36]. 
4.1.3 Financial management 
Respondents felt that, the Government’s allocation of funds for schools were in some instances 
inadequate and the regulations governing its distribution were restrictive. One principal said “I do not 
see how schools can function without school fees.” (Interview 9 Ln. 396). The National quintile a 
school falls within, determine the level of funding a school receives and respondents almost 
unanimously agreed that these were incorrectly arrived at. A typical quote from SGBs in focus groups 
was “the quintiles are allocated wrongly “(Interview 9 Ln. 397) 
The findings in this study also contradict what the “No fees” school policy hoped to achieve, namely 
educational equality between the affluent and the poorer schools [37].In reality the gap is fast 
becoming a chasm, as the department official so conclusively admits, namely “There was never ever 
going to be a possibility of parity. So I think we are deepening poverty and the differences between our 
learners.” (Interview 6, Ln. 288-291). 
However, it seems as if a paramount criterion in selecting a candidate for a promotion post is that “the 
State is an affirmative action employer.” Loggenberg, [38] reports on what President Zuma’s said, in 
what she entitles “Vote to benefit from Affirmative action” in the 2014 election campaign. It was 
reported that President Zuma promised coloured people in the Western Cape, that if they voted for the 
ANC they would reap the benefits of Affirmative action [39]. 
The best example is in 2013 when they wanted to apportion blame for Limpopo they chose the 
Director General, whereas the fault lay with Provincial government, since DoE design policy and the 
different provinces implement these policies. So provinces inability to implement shows a lack of skills 
and capacity, but who did the union target, wasn’t those officials but the Minister of Basic Education 
and the DG and so the DG had to take the fall.” (Interview 12, Ln.763-780) 
The findings in this article relates unequivocally to Conflict Theory as espoused by Ritzer (1998) and 
namely that SGBs as the fourth tier of the ANC led government are expected to reflect the ANC 
ideology of transformation and equity, in order to maintain the ruling party’s hegemony over schools as 
part of the political system. When this ideology namely transformation and equity does not permeate 
all schools which in South Africa is part of the political system, it spells the doom of the ANC’s power 
over society since its loyal supporters and voters will become disillusioned. It is the electorate who 
ensure the ANC’s domination and thus this hegemonic ideology must be preserved. Ritzer (2008) 
substantiates this reasoning when he asserts that a parochial political perspective is typical of a 
culture, embedded in a traditional environment. In South Africa, African cultures contain individuals 
who have a dim awareness of the larger political system beyond their immediate local 
environment[40].  
5 CONCLUSION 
School Governing Bodies’ have a statutory responsibility and were awarded many critical functions 
within schools which could make a valuable contribution to ensuring a school’s effectiveness and 
continuing improvement. The State furtively amended the SASA which in effect decimated the SGB’s 
power. The new education system encourages community participation. However, bureaucrats very 
often do not necessarily adhere to tenets of democracy as emphasised in the South African 
Constitution and the SASA. Dieltiens [41] points out that, deliberate democrats justify democracy as a 
process where everyone participates in the policy-making process. The challenge for participatory 
democracy is when the individuals and groups have conflicting value systems and political agendas. It 
is important to keep sight of the fact that parents are volunteers. They are often highly motivated, but 
the trend of government to diminish original responsibilities and decision-making which SGBs 
possessed has led to disillusionment. The school governance model is structured for representative 
democracy through the triannual electoral process and inclusion of relevant role-players. Although the 
SGBs participation in school affairs is far reaching it falls short in terms of the full participation in the 
allocated functions. In principle, governance partnerships lay a foundation for democracy. Effective 
participation and functionality is dependent on SGBs possessing the power to debate, argue and 
compromise which will result in decisiveness and accountability and ultimately Homeostasis will be 
achieved between SGBs and the State. In this regard Karlsson [22] explains that SGBs are the 
structures through which parents, educators, non-educators and learners (in secondary schools) can 
guarantee that the main objective of a school is realised, which is, that the child receives quality 
education. 
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